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Abstract 
In prior research on false autobiographical beliefs and memories, subjects have been 
asked to imagine fictional events and they have been exposed to false evidence that 
indicates the fictional events occurred. But what are the relative contributions of 
imagination and false evidence toward false belief and memory construction? 
Subjects observed and copied various simple actions, then viewed doctored videos 
that suggested they had performed extra actions, and they imagined performing 
some of those and some other actions. Subjects returned two weeks later for a 
memory test. False evidence or imagination alone was often sufficient to cause 
belief and memory distortions; the two techniques in combination appeared to have 
additive or even superadditive effects. The results bear on the mechanisms 
underlying false beliefs and memories, and we propose legal and clinical 
applications of these findings. 
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Digitally Manipulating Memory: Effects of Doctored Videos and Imagination in 
Distorting Beliefs and Memories 
Memory scientists have amply demonstrated the malleability of people’s 
memories for distant events (e.g. Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004; 
Loftus & Pickrell, 1995) and for recent events (e.g. Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Thomas 
& Loftus, 2002). Although methodologies have varied from study to study, a 
substantial number of false memory experiments show that the act of imagining is 
key to false memory development (Goff & Roediger, 1998; Hyman, Husband, & 
Billings, 1995; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003). Yet current research suggests that 
fabricated evidence can produce a similar response (Garry & Wade, 2005; Nash & 
Wade, in press; Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002). The question we ask here is: 
How do imagination and false evidence work individually and in combination to 
produce false beliefs and false memories? 
Source Monitoring 
Johnson and colleagues’ Source Monitoring Framework (SMF) can be used to 
make predictions about a wide range of false memory phenomena (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981; Lindsay, 2008). According to 
the SMF, remembering is an inferential process: people must attribute mental 
experiences, such as thoughts, images, and feelings that come to mind to particular 
origins (although typically such attributions are made quickly and without conscious 
deliberation).  False memories arise when mental events from one source are 
misattributed to another (erroneous) source. People can make source judgments by 
relying on environmental cues (e.g. official records/documentation; see Wade & 
Garry, 2005) and various qualitative and quantitative cues from memory itself.  For 
instance, real memories typically contain more sensory information (such as smells, 
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sounds, and visual details) and more contextual cues (information about the time 
and location) than do imagined events (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). 
Real memories often also contain details that act as a marker of their veracity; for 
instance, one would expect a real memory of a conversation with a friend to contain 
auditory records of the friend’s voice rather than another person’s voice. When 
internally generated images are rich with memory-like characteristics such as vivid 
sensory detail and event-consistent information, though, source monitoring errors 
can occur. 
Laboratory-based False Memories 
Memory scientists have developed numerous paradigms for examining false 
memory phenomena in the laboratory (see Pezdek & Lam, 2007; Wade et al., 2007, 
for partial reviews). Some studies have distorted memories for non-autobiographical 
experiences (e.g. DRM studies, Roediger & McDermott, 1995), whereas others have 
distorted memories for self-involving, moderately significant autobiographical 
experiences (e.g. Desjardins & Scoboria, 2007). The latter literature reveals two 
techniques that are commonly used to induce false memories: [1] encouraging 
individuals to imagine counterfactual events and [2] presenting individuals with 
false evidence that implies the counterfactual events occurred.  
In terms of imagination, we know that merely imagining a fictitious event can 
lead people to report that they remember doing something they never did (Hyman & 
Pentland, 1996; Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996; Mazzoni & Memon, 
2003; Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, & Gabbay, 2006). Goff and Roediger (1998), for 
instance, found that the more times subjects imagined performing non-performed 
actions, the more likely they were to claim they had actually performed them (see 
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also Johnson, Raye, Wang, & Taylor, 1979). Indeed, this imagination inflation 
effect is a robust phenomenon (Garry & Polaschek, 2000). 
With regard to effects of false evidence, recent research reveals that such 
information can distort memory. Bernstein and colleagues (Bernstein, Laney, 
Morris & Loftus, 2005a) gave some adults false feedback that suggested they had 
gotten sick as children from eating hard-boiled eggs, and approximately 25% 
reported a specific belief or memory for the fictitious event. In a follow-up study, 
food-related false memories caused people to avoid certain foods later on (Geraerts 
et al., 2008). Wade and colleagues showed that fake photographs can also induce 
false memories (Garry & Wade, 2005; Wade et al., 2002). They gave adults 
photographs of themselves as children and asked them to recall the events depicted 
in each photo. Unbeknownst to the subjects, the experimenters faked one of the 
photos by digitally pasting a childhood image of the subject into a hot-air balloon 
scene. After working at remembering the pseudo-event for one week, 50% came to 
falsely recall aspects of the balloon ride. Together, these false evidence studies 
illustrate the powerful impact that environmental influences can have on memory.   
Why do imagination and false evidence distort our beliefs and memories? 
Imagination, according to the SMF, promotes perceptual and contextual details in 
mental imagery. When we imagine a counterfactual experience we embellish that 
event with details that are characteristic of a real memory, causing the imagined 
event to feel phenomenologically similar to a real memory. In line with this account, 
imagined events are more often misremembered as actual events by individuals with 
good imagery (Johnson et al., 1979); or if the events are inherently easy to imagine 
(Finke, Johnson, & Shyi, 1988); or if conditions lead subjects to include sensory 
details in their imaginings (Thomas, Bulevich, & Loftus, 2003).  
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From an SMF perspective, false evidence might foster false memories in three 
qualitatively different ways. First, analogous to imagination, false evidence may 
reduce differences between imagined events and real memories by providing fluent 
perceptual details that can be combined with products of imagination. In Lindsay et 
al. (2004), for example, subjects worked at remembering a childhood prank that 
they and a classmate had supposedly played (but that almost certainly had not really 
happened—namely, putting Slime in their teacher’s desk). Half of the subjects were 
given their real class-group photo for that school year to use as a “memory cue.”  
False memories were twice as common among subjects given the class photo.  
Lindsay et al. speculated that one mechanism for this effect was that the photo 
enabled subjects to form vivid and perceptually detailed images of their teachers, 
classmates, and selves which could be combined with products of imagination to 
create compelling false memories. 
 False evidence may also foster false memories by increasing the perceived 
plausibility of the suggested event. Individuals are unlikely to develop false 
memories unless they accept the suggested event as something that could plausibly 
have happened (Hart & Schooler, 2006; Johnson & Raye, 2000; Mazzoni & Kirsch, 
2002; Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997; for a discussion of social-influence processes 
by which implausible ideas can come to seem plausible, see Lynn, Pintar, Stafford, 
Marmelstein, & Lock, 1998).  To the extent that it is persuasive, false evidence by 
definition will increase the perceived plausibility of the suggested event.      
Finally, false evidence might encourage people to lower their criteria for 
believing a particular event occurred, and for the amount of detail a mental image of 
that event must possess before attributing it to memory (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002). 
Put differently, even if seeing the doctored video had no effect upon the perceptual 
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detail of their mental imagery or the plausibility of the suggestion, it might 
nevertheless make a person willing to attribute somewhat less vivid images of 
suggested events to memory. 
In sum, previous research leads us to believe that imagination and false evidence 
are powerful forms of suggestion. What we do not know, however, is what the 
individual and combined effects of these two influences are. Almost all false 
evidence studies to date have confounded false evidence with imagination. In the 
sole exception of which we are aware, Bernstein, Laney, Morris and Loftus (2005b) 
gave subjects false feedback that they had become sick from eating strawberry ice-
cream, and half were also encouraged to imagine what might have happened. 
Although the false feedback alone increased subjects’ confidence that the suggested 
event occurred, imagination increased their confidence even more. Bernstein et al.’s 
research suggests that imagination and false evidence might have unique effects on 
subjects’ beliefs, but because the authors did not independently manipulate these 
two factors, we cannot say for sure what the separate and combined effects might 
be.  
The Present Experiments 
We developed a novel procedure for assessing the effects of imagination and 
false evidence on beliefs and memories. Subjects observed and copied various 
simple actions, then viewed doctored videos that suggested they had performed 
extra actions; they also imagined performing some of the actions in the doctored 
video and some other non-performed actions. Finally, subjects returned two weeks 
later for a memory test. 
 
 
 8 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 addressed three research questions. First, can doctored video 
evidence alone change individuals’ beliefs and memories about their recent 
experiences? At least one study (Bernstein et al., 2005b) has shown that false 
evidence alone can distort people’s beliefs about childhood experiences, so we 
predicted that subjects would be more certain that they performed critical actions 
shown in the doctored video than those not in the video. Second, which technique—
imagination or false evidence—has a greater distortive influence? Because most 
studies have confounded the two techniques, we had no theoretical reason to predict 
that one would be more powerful than the other. Finally, what is the combined 
effect of imagination and false evidence? The answer to this question would allow 
us to speculate about the cognitive mechanisms that drive the false evidence effect.  
In addition, we had a secondary interest in determining whether imagination and 
false evidence influence beliefs and memories of both memorable and less 
memorable actions. Several studies have investigated the effects of imagining 
different types of actions by manipulating the bizarreness of the actions (e.g. 
Seamon, Philbin, & Harrison, 2006), reasoning that people should be more capable 
of rejecting bizarre false events than familiar ones. Some researchers more broadly 
discuss “memorability-based strategies”  that incorporate numerous possible 
characteristics—including bizarreness—that might help a person to reject a false 
suggestion (Ghetti, 2003; Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 1986). In Experiment 1, 
therefore, we manipulated the memorability of the critical actions to explore this 
issue. It is worth noting, though, that the memorability of these actions is likely to 
be highly correlated with their bizarreness, as well as other similar characteristics. 
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Method 
Subjects and Design 
Forty-seven University of Victoria (Canada) undergraduates received optional 
bonus points in a psychology course for individually participating in three sessions 
over 11-21 days (M = 14.55 days, SD = 2.58)1. We used a 2 (video vs. no-video) x 2 
(imagine vs. no-imagine) within-subjects design. The procedure is outlined in 
Appendix A.  
Materials and Procedure 
Selecting the Critical and Non-critical Actions  
We selected 37 actions such as “flip the coin” and “put on the hat.” Of those, 16 
were taken from Goff and Roediger (1998), 5 (1 familiar and 4 bizarre) were taken 
from Thomas and Loftus (2002), and 16 were additional actions that we created or 
adapted (see Appendix B for a full list). We asked 25 volunteers to rate on a scale 
from 1 (I’d easily remember doing this) to 7 (I’d easily forget doing this) how 
memorable each action would be to somebody who had performed it 2 weeks 
earlier. Based on these ratings, we chose four critical actions that differed in 
memorability (all ps < .05): Kiss the magnifying glass (M = 2.32, SD = 1.46); Rub 
the Q-tip on the toy car (M = 3.32, SD = 1.73); Roll the dice (M = 4.52, SD = 1.50); 
Browse the book (M = 5.48, SD = 1.16). We randomly assigned the critical actions 
to four within-subject conditions: [1] Video-Only, [2] Imagine-Only, [3] 
Video+Imagine, and [4] Control. Critical Video actions (i.e. Video-Only and 
Video+Imagine conditions) were actions that subjects would view in a doctored 
video. Critical Imagine actions (i.e. Imagine-Only and Video+Imagine conditions) 
were actions that subjects would imagine performing. Finally, the Control action 
neither appeared in the video nor was imagined. Subjects did not perform the 
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critical actions at any stage. The remaining 33 actions served as non-critical (filler) 
actions in different stages of the experiment—some were performed in Session 1; 
some were imagined in Session 2 but not performed; some were new in Session 3—
and ranged in memorability at each session.  We had no plans to analyse subjects’ 
ratings for the non-critical actions so we did not counterbalance these actions.  
Session 1: Event Phase 
Subjects were seated at a table opposite a Research Assistant (RA). They were 
told that the experimenters were interested in mental imagery and that they would 
be filmed observing and copying the RA performing some actions. The objects 
necessary for performing the actions (e.g. a coin, a hat) were arranged on the table: 
one set for the subject, one set for the RA. Subjects familiarized themselves with the 
objects and the remainder of Session 1 was captured on video (see Figure 1 for a 
representative still depicting the camera’s field of view). The RA began by 
performing an action for 15 s, then the subject copied the same action for 15 s. A 
loud beep indicated when the subject and RA should start and stop performing each 
action. Next, the RA performed a second action, and this process continued until the 
RA and the subject had performed 26 non-critical actions. All subjects performed 
the same actions and these ranged in memorability. 
Creating the Doctored Videos for Session 2. Immediately after the subject left, 
we filmed the RA performing two of the four critical actions which would serve as 
our doctored video clips in Session 2 (the Video+Imagine and Video-Only actions). 
We created two fake clips by combining these extra video clips with clips of the 
subject observing the RA at Session 1 (see Figure 1). Note that the fake clips did not 
show the subject performing the critical actions, only observing the RA perform 
them. To enhance acceptance of the fake clips, we inserted them into a 5-min 
 11 
sequence made up of 10 untouched clips of the subjects observing the RA perform 
actions that really had been performed in Session 1. Thus, each subject’s video 
contained twelve 10-s clips separated by 15-s pauses. Clips 7 and 10 were always 
the fake clips and the remaining clips depicted the same non-critical actions for all 
subjects.  
Session 2: Suggestion Phase 
Session 2 was conducted 2 days later and comprised two tasks. In the first task, 
subjects were exposed to the fake video clips. Subjects were seated in front of a 
computer and told that they would watch several video clips of themselves watching 
the RA perform actions at Session 1. They were instructed to write down at the end 
  (a) 
  (c) 
  (b) 
Figure 1. The video-doctoring process. In (a), the subject (right) observes the RA 
perform an action during Session 1; in (b), the RA performs an extra action after the 
subject has gone; (c) is a composite of the right side of (a) and the left side of (b). 
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of each clip the name of the action the RA performed. This task ensured that 
subjects attended to each clip.  
For the second task the subject was instructed to imagine performing some 
actions. Subjects were told that an action sentence would appear on the monitor, and 
their task was to close their eyes and imagine performing that action for 10 s, after 
which they would hear a beep. To encourage subjects to imagine every action, they 
were asked to rate the vividness of their images as per Thomas and Loftus (2002). 
Subjects imagined 15 action sentences, each repeated four times (60 actions in total, 
presented to each subject in the same quasi-random order). Two of the 15 were 
critical actions: one had been presented in the doctored video (Video+Imagine), and 
one had not (Imagine-Only). The remaining 13 actions were non-critical actions (9 
performed; 4 non-performed actions intended to make salient to subjects that they 
did not perform all the imagined actions). The imagination task lasted 15 minutes. 
Session 3: Memory Test 
Session 3 was conducted approximately 2 weeks after Session 1. The memory 
test contained 28 action sentences, including all 4 critical actions and 24 non-critical 
actions (17 performed during Session 1; 4 unperformed but imagined in Session 2; 
and 3 new). Subjects answered two questions about each action, based on Scoboria, 
Mazzoni, Kirsch and Relyea’s (2004) Autobiographical Beliefs and Memory 
Questionnaire. First, subjects rated the extent to which they believed they performed 
each action, using a scale from 1 (I definitely did not do this) to 8 (I definitely did 
do this). Next they rated their memory of performing each action, from 1 (No 
memory of doing this) to 8 (Clear and detailed memory of doing this). Finally, 
subjects wrote down what they thought the aim of the experiment was, and the 
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experimenter debriefed them. Subjects were also invited to attempt to identify 
which two actions from the memory test were the critical Video actions. 
Results and Discussion 
Subjects’ Acceptance of the Video Evidence 
Several reasons led us to be confident that subjects were unaware of the true 
nature of the experiment. First, no subject reported that the aim of the study was to 
investigate the effects of false video evidence. Second, many subjects indicated that 
they were surprised the video had been edited (“It was changed? I didn’t notice that 
at all!” “Oh, it was? I didn’t have a clue!”). Third, 47% of subjects failed to identify 
either of the critical Video actions. On average, subjects identified 0.66 out of 2 
critical actions. Together, these findings suggest that subjects generally accepted the 
video as an accurate record. 
Nevertheless, although no subjects claimed the video was edited, some appeared 
to suspect they were being tricked. We categorized subjects as suspicious if they 
indicated at any stage that there were actions in the video they did not think they 
performed, or if they successfully identified both critical video actions. The 12 
subjects who met these criteria did not significantly differ from other subjects in 
their Belief or Memory ratings for any critical action type (smallest non-adjusted p 
= .061), thus the following analyses include data from all 47 subjects.  
Belief and Memory Rating 
We now turn to our primary questions. First, was doctored video evidence alone 
sufficient to change subjects’ beliefs and memories? Figure 2 shows that it was: 
subjects rated Video-Only actions higher than Control actions on both the Belief 
[t(46) = 3.50, p < .01, dz = .51] and Memory [t(46) = 2.17, p = .04, dz = .32] scales. 
Second, which technique—imagination or false evidence—had the greater influence 
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upon beliefs and memories? Our data suggest that in isolation, the two techniques 
had equivalent effects: both influenced beliefs and memories (although the 
difference between Imagine-Only and Control actions on the Memory measure did 
not reach conventional significance, t(46) = 1.73, p = .09, dz = .25), and there were 
no differences between Video-Only and Imagine-Only actions on the Belief [t(46) = 
.94, p = .35, dz = .14] or Memory [t(46) = .60, p = .55, dz = .09] scale. These results 
lead us to conclude that watching a 10-s doctored video clip was just as hazardous 
as imagining a critical action for 40 s. 
Finally, by looking more closely at the data represented in Figure 2 to examine 
how false evidence and imagination interact, we can speculate about the 
mechanisms responsible for the false evidence effect.2 Two 2 (video vs. no-video) x 
2 (imagined vs. not imagined) within-subjects ANOVAs revealed no significant 
interactions on either Belief or Memory, although the interaction for Memory 
ratings approached the conventional significance level [Belief, F(1, 46) = .40, p = 
Figure 2. Mean Belief and Memory ratings across conditions in Experiment 1. Error 
bars represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Belief
Memory
Video+Imagine Video-Only Imagine-Only Control
M
e
a
n
 r
a
ti
n
g
Condition
 15 
.53, ηp2 = .01, 95% CI = .00 ≤ ηp2 ≤ .12; Memory, F(1, 46) = 3.46, p = .07, ηp2 = 
.07, 95% CI = .00 ≤ ηp2 ≤ .24]3. These null interactions suggest that the combined 
effects of the two techniques were additive. However, because there was a tendency 
towards a superadditive combined effect for Memory, and because of the problems 
inherent in inferring additivity from a null interaction, we conducted some 
additional analyses to further examine these data. We calculated the mean 
Video+Imagine ratings that should be predicted given an additive combined effect, 
by adding the mean ratings for Video-Only and Imagine-Only actions, and 
subtracting the mean Control rating from this value (note that Video-Only and 
Imagine-Only ratings both comprise a unique effect plus a baseline, equivalent to 
the mean Control rating). Table 1 shows that our observed Video+Imagine Memory 
ratings were significantly greater than the predicted mean, whereas the Belief 
ratings did not significantly differ. In short, although the analyses generally support 
an additive account of the effects of false evidence and imagination, there was 
nevertheless some indication that the two effects may have combined 
superadditively. We return to these findings in the General Discussion. 
 
Table 1. Predicted and Observed Mean Ratings for Video+Imagine Actions in 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
 Predicted 
mean rating 
Observed 
mean rating 
p (one-
sample t-test) 
Experiment 1    
Belief 5.38 5.87 .20 
Memory 3.45 4.79 .002 
Experiment 2    
Belief  6.13 6.15 .96 
Memory 4.83 4.94 .77 
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Memorability 
To examine whether our memorability manipulation affected subjects’ Belief 
and Memory ratings, we classified the two more memorable critical actions (Kiss 
the magnifying glass, Rub the Q-tip on the toy car) as high-memorability, and the 
two less memorable critical actions (Roll the dice, Browse the book) as low-
memorability. Across all conditions, subjects gave higher Belief [t(186) = 2.85, p = 
.005, d = .42] and Memory ratings [t(186) = 2.112, p = .04, d = .31] to low-
memorability actions than to high-memorability actions (see Total row in Table 2), 
therefore our subjects could to some extent use a memorability-based strategy to 
identify critical actions they would not expect to forget performing (Ghetti, 2003; 
Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002). 
How did imagination and false evidence affect subjects’ Belief and Memory 
ratings for low-memorability and high-memorability actions? Recall that both 
imagination and false evidence increased subjects’ ratings overall (see Total 
columns in Table 2). Our memorability analyses—also shown in Table 2—showed 
that this pattern was true of both low- and high-memorability actions. Put 
differently, imagining an action or seeing it in the doctored video caused similar 
levels of belief and memory distortion for high-memorability actions as they did for 
low-memorability actions (for all interactions, p > .19, all ηp2 < .01). 
Summary 
Even without imagination, our doctored videos were sufficient to cause 
significant belief and memory distortions. Doctored videos appeared to be at least as 
powerful as imagination, and when the two forms of suggestion were combined, 
they had an additive or superadditive effect. The large distortive effects found in 
previous false evidence studies may, therefore, be just as attributable to the 
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imagination tasks subjects were given as to the false evidence itself. Moreover, both 
suggestive techniques in Experiment 1 increased subjects’ belief in low- and in 
high-memorability actions, providing evidence that the techniques’ effects are not 
limited to forgettable experiences. 
 
Table 2. Mean Belief and Memory Ratings as a Function of Memorability and of 
Presence or Absence of Video and Imagination (SD in parentheses). 
 Belief Memory 
 Memorability 
 High Low Total High Low Total 
No-video 2.30 
(2.23) 
3.32 
(2.49) 
2.81 
(2.40) 
1.85 
(2.16) 
2.26 
(2.19) 
2.05 
(2.17) 
Video 4.30 
(2.77) 
5.55 
(2.63) 
4.93 
(2.76) 
3.15 
(2.79) 
4.36 
(2.74) 
3.76 
(2.82) 
Not 
imagined 
2.30 
(2.09) 
3.79 
(2.69) 
3.04 
(2.51) 
1.55 
(1.53) 
2.83 
(2.51) 
2.19 
(2.17) 
Imagined 4.30 
(2.87) 
5.09 
(2.74) 
4.69 
(2.82) 
3.45 
(3.02) 
3.79 
(2.79) 
3.62 
(2.90) 
Total 3.30 
(2.70) 
4.44 
(2.78) 
3.87 
(2.79) 
2.50 
(2.56) 
3.31 
(2.68) 
2.90 
(2.65) 
Note: Each row represents mean ratings for two critical actions combined. For 
example, the ‘no-video’ data combine ratings for Imagine-Only and Control 
actions. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 2 examined whether the effects of imagination and false evidence 
would persist if subjects were warned that videos can easily be tampered with and 
that imagining counterfactual events can inflate one’s confidence. In the false 
memory literature, a handful of studies have investigated the influence of warnings 
on subjects’ resistance to suggestion, and the results have been mixed. In the 
misinformation domain, Greene, Flynn, and Loftus (1982) found that warning 
subjects before, but not after, they were exposed to misinformation helped them to 
resist suggestion. Chambers and Zaragoza (2001), however, found that warnings 
helped subjects regardless of when they were delivered. In studies of the Deese-
Roediger-McDermott effect, pre-encoding warnings robustly reduced the rate of 
false memories whereas the efficacy of post-encoding warnings depended on other 
variables (e.g., Gallo, Roediger, & McDermott, 2001; McCabe & Smith, 2002; 
Watson, McDermott, & Balota, 2004). Two studies of greatest relevance to the 
current research have also found mixed results: Landau and von Glahn (2004) found 
that subjects who received warnings about imagination exhibited a smaller inflation 
effect than those who received no warning; whereas a study from the 
communications literature (Kelly & Nace, 1994) revealed that warnings about the 
capabilities of digital editing software failed to reduce subjects’ belief in news 
articles and photos from disreputable sources. Taken as a whole, these studies show 
that warnings—and especially post-encoding warnings—work under certain 
conditions but not others. For now, it is not clear when warnings protect subjects 
from the effects of suggestive techniques.  
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Method 
Subjects and Design 
Forty-eight University of Warwick (United Kingdom) undergraduates received 
£8 for participating in three sessions over 13-16 days (M = 14.83 days, SD = 1.02). 
We used a 2 (video vs. no-video) x 2 (imagine vs. no-imagine) within-subjects 
design, and added a 2 (video warning vs. no video warning) x 2 (imagination 
warning vs. no imagination warning) between-subjects manipulation. Subjects were 
randomly allocated to warning conditions.  
Materials and Procedure  
Selecting the Critical and Non-critical Actions  
We selected 45 of Goff and Roediger’s (1998) non-object actions (listed in 
Appendix B) and, because we did not manipulate memorability in Experiment 2, 
from those we chose four critical actions that 25 volunteers rated as moderately 
memorable on a scale from 1 (I’d easily remember doing this) to 7 (I’d easily forget 
doing this). The critical actions were: Clap your hands (M = 4.68, SD = 1.93); 
Salute (M = 4.44, SD = 1.58; Click your fingers (M = 4.56, SD = 2.22); and Flex 
your arm (M = 5.04, SD = 1.64); all ps > .05. The remaining 41 actions served as 
non-critical (filler) actions at various stages of the experiment.  
The Warnings 
Video warning. The video warning served to prime subjects’ knowledge about 
digital image editing. We modified a warning from Dreifus (2007): 
In society today, we’re now seeing doctored photos and doctored videos 
regularly. For example, if tabloids can’t obtain a photo of Brad Pitt and 
Angelina Jolie walking together on a beach, they’ll make up a composite 
from two pictures. As a result, we now live in an age when the once-held 
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belief that photographs and videos were reliable records of events is now 
gone. 
 Imagination warning. The imagination warning served to alert subjects to the 
possibility that a clear memory-like mental image could be an imagined event. We 
modified Landau and von Glahn’s (2004) warning: 
Imagining has been found to alter people’s confidence that they 
performed an action. This happens because after imagining, people often 
don’t carefully scrutinize their memory to decide whether the action was 
real or imagined. In other words, people are often more likely to believe 
they performed an action if they imagined doing it, because they confuse 
the details of the imagined memory as real. 
 
Session 1 (Event Phase) and Session 2 (Suggestion Phase) 
These sessions were similar to Experiment 1 with some minor changes. To 
increase the pace of the task, in Session 1 the RA and the subject performed each 
action for 12 s rather than 15 s. In addition, we shortened the gaps between clips in 
the video sequence used in Session 2 to 10 s rather than 15 s. Finally, subjects 
imagined 64 actions in the imagination task in Session 2, rather than 60 actions. 
Session 3: Memory Test 
The memory test was similar to that used in Experiment 1. Prior to completing 
the memory test, subjects (except “no-warning” subjects) were exposed to the 
appropriate warning(s). They listened to audio recordings of the warning(s) and 
simultaneously viewed the written warning on a computer monitor. Finally, subjects 
were instructed to consider the warning(s) as they completed the memory test. 
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Results and Discussion 
Once again, subjects appeared to be unaware that the video had been edited, and 
they expressed surprise when they discovered the real purpose of the study. Only 
17% correctly identified one of the critical video actions, and no subjects correctly 
identified both. Only one subject (who received the video warning) speculated that 
the study was investigating false evidence; this is surprising given that 50% of 
subjects received the video warning. 
The Effects of Warnings 
We conducted two 2 (video vs. no-video) x 2 (imagined vs. not imagined) x 2 
(video warning vs. no-video warning) x 2 (imagination warning vs. no-imagination 
warning) mixed-factor ANOVAs. These analyses revealed no significant 
interactions or main effects involving the warning variables on either the Belief or 
Memory measures (all ps > .23, largest ηp2 = .03; see Table 3). However, there was 
a non-significant tendency for video-warning subjects to report lower ratings for the 
critical Video actions than did no-video-warning subjects (pooling across the 
Video+Imagine and Video-Only actions, dBelief = .27; dMemory = .32). Despite this 
trend, video-warning subjects still reported moderately high levels of Belief (M = 
5.08) and Memory (M = 3.83) for the two critical Video actions. These findings lead 
us to conclude that although explicit information about digital editing might prompt 
people to more systematically evaluate their beliefs and memories, like in Kelly and 
Nace’s (1994) study the warning in this experiment was insufficient to protect 
subjects from distortions. A stronger or more explicit warning, therefore, might 
reveal an effect. Our findings contrast with those of Landau and von Glahn (2004), 
whose results suggest subjects should have successfully used the imagination 
warning to resist belief and memory distortions.  
 22 
Why did our warnings fail to significantly influence subjects’ Belief and 
Memory ratings? One possibility is that many subjects simply did not recognise the 
information as a “warning” per se. Indeed, most “video warning” subjects did not 
guess the purpose of the study, which suggests that they were not particularly 
suspicious. This proposition raises an interesting question for future research on 
warnings: Do warnings only protect people from misinformation if they already 
suspect they may have been misled? Moreover, although Landau and von Glahn 
(2004) effectively reduced imagination inflation by warning subjects after they 
imagined events, it is likely that, as in Greene et al.’s (1982) study and the DRM 
warning studies cited above, our warnings would be more effective if subjects 
received them before seeing the doctored video and imagining. 
Belief and Memory Rating 
As Figure 3 shows, we replicated the pattern of results obtained in Experiment 
1. Doctored videos alone were sufficient to change subjects’ beliefs and memories: 
subjects rated Video-Only actions higher than Control actions on the Belief [t(47) = 
4.35, p < .001, dz = .63] and Memory scales [t(47) = 4.30, p < .001, dz = .62]. 
Similarly, they rated Imagine-Only actions higher than Control actions on the Belief 
[t(47) = 3.87, p < .001, dz = .56] and Memory scales [t(47) = 3.79, p < .001, dz = 
.55]. The differences between Video-Only and Imagine-Only actions were not 
significant on either measure [Belief, t(47) = .89, p = .38, dz = .13; Memory, t(47) = 
1.10, p = .28, dz = .16].  
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Table 3. Mean Belief and Memory Ratings as a Function of the Presence or 
Absence of Each Warning Type (SD in parentheses). N =24 for each row. 
Warning condition Video+ 
Imagine 
Video-Only Imagine-
Only 
Control 
Belief     
No Video-warning 6.46 (2.06) 5.00 (2.50) 4.08 (2.38) 2.79 (1.72) 
Video-warning 5.83 (2.33) 4.33 (2.79) 4.29 (2.40) 2.67 (1.58) 
No Imagination-warning 6.00 (2.52) 4.71 (2.42) 4.21 (2.17) 2.54 (1.38) 
Imagination-warning 6.29 (1.88) 4.63 (2.90) 4.17 (2.60) 2.92 (1.86) 
Memory     
No Video-warning 5.46 (2.38) 3.88 (2.64) 2.92 (2.43) 1.71 (1.33) 
Video-warning 4.42 (2.71) 3.25 (2.69) 3.00 (2.47) 1.67 (1.52) 
No Imagination-warning 5.25 (2.59) 3.63 (2.48) 3.04 (2.22) 1.58 (1.21) 
Imagination-warning 4.63 (2.58) 3.50 (2.87) 2.88 (2.66) 1.79 (1.62) 
Note: Each row represents mean ratings for two warning conditions. For example, 
the ‘no video-warning’ data combine ratings for Imagination-Warning-Only and 
No-Warning subjects. 
 
Continuing with the within-subject effects represented in Figure 3, the results of 
the mixed-factor ANOVAs revealed no significant interactions of imagination and 
false evidence upon Belief [F(1, 44) = .001, p = .97, ηp2 < .01, 95% CI = .00 ≤ ηp2 ≤ 
.0001] or Memory ratings [F(1, 44) = .04, p = .85, ηp2 < .01, 95% CI = .00 ≤ ηp2 ≤ 
.03], suggesting that the effects operated additively. A further demonstration of this 
additivity comes from the data in Table 1, which show that subjects’ mean Belief 
and Memory ratings for Video+Imagine actions were extremely similar to those 
predicted by the independent effects of the doctored video and imagination.  
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Experiment 2 provides further evidence that imagination can influence people’s 
beliefs and memories about self-involving, recent actions, but so too can false 
evidence. Moreover, the combination of these techniques leads to significantly more 
belief and memory distortion than either technique alone, with the two effects 
appearing to be additive. Finally, neither an explicit post-suggestion warning about 
digital image editing nor a warning about imagination inflation were sufficient to 
significantly reduce these effects. 
General Discussion 
In two experiments, we assessed the individual and combined contributions of 
imagination and false evidence to the distortion of beliefs and memories. We found 
that both forms of suggestion are considerably influential. These experiments are 
the first to demonstrate that false evidence can create false memories of recent 
Figure 3. Mean Belief and Memory ratings across conditions in Experiment 2. Error 
bars represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Belief
Memory
Video+Imagine Video-Only Imagine-Only Control
M
e
a
n
 r
a
ti
n
g
Condition
 25 
actions. Consistent with the findings from distant (childhood) memory studies (e.g. 
Wade et al., 2002), less than two weeks after seeing our doctored videos many 
subjects confidently reported performing the suggested actions (“Those [the critical 
video actions] were particularly clear in my mind that I did them. I was 100% 
clear!”). Whereas Wade and colleagues’ false evidence actually depicted subjects 
performing the fictional act (Garry & Wade, 2005; Nash & Wade, in press; Wade et 
al., 2002), and other authors have used explicit and affirmative verbal feedback as 
evidence (Bernstein et al., 2005a; Desjardins & Scoboria, 2007), the false evidence 
in the present study was less explicit. Indeed, subjects neither saw themselves 
perform the critical actions nor did they receive a verbal suggestion. This implicit 
trickery was highly effective despite the fact that over half of subjects in Experiment 
2 (58.3%) reported having used digital-editing software in the past. 
The combined effects of imagination and false evidence enable us to speculate 
about how false evidence might influence beliefs and memories. Certainly, there 
was no indication in either experiment that imagination and false evidence have 
subadditive effects. This finding suggests that the false evidence effect is not caused 
by the videos’ ability to help people to imagine counterfactual events, because the 
effect of imagining typically diminishes as one’s mental imagery becomes more 
detailed (Goff & Roediger, 1998; Henkel & Carbuto, in press; Thomas & Loftus, 
2002). Rather, our findings of additivity are most supportive of a criterion-based 
account of the false evidence effect. Guided by the SMF, Mazzoni and Kirsch 
(2002) proposed that autobiographical distortions are products of the combination of 
two factors: [1] a lowered memory criterion (i.e., lower expectations for the amount 
of memorial information required to attribute a mental experience to memory), and 
[2] enhanced mental imagery. Doctored videos, we expect, provide the first of these 
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two factors—they cause subjects to lower their criteria for attributing images to 
memory—whereas imagination provides the second. This criteria-based 
interpretation of our findings can be reframed as follows: Sometimes our subjects 
experienced false memories if their mental imagery quality was poor, but they had 
cause to adopt low criteria (Video-Only); similarly, they sometimes experienced 
false memories if they had high criteria, but their mental imagery quality was also 
high (Imagine-Only). However, subjects were naturally most susceptible to false 
memories if they had cause to adopt low criteria and their mental imagery quality 
was high (Video+Imagine). 
Nevertheless, in Experiment 1 we obtained some evidence indicative of a 
superadditive combined effect. Because imagining plausible events causes more 
memory distortion than does imagining implausible events (Pezdek et al., 2006), it 
is likely that superadditivity would occur if false evidence works by increasing the 
perceived plausibility of suggestions. Perhaps, then, the critical actions in 
Experiment 2—which could well have been more plausible than those in 
Experiment 1—might be the reason we did not replicate the evidence of 
superadditivity obtained in Experiment 1. Future research should examine more 
directly the mechanisms that drive the false evidence effect. 
Our findings have practical implications beyond understanding the mechanisms 
responsible for false beliefs and memories, and raise several important questions for 
future research. For instance, can video evidence induce people to testify about 
events that never happened? This is a question we are currently investigating, and 
we know of at least one real-life case that speaks to this issue. Loftus and colleagues 
have discussed the case of “Jane Doe,” who apparently recovered memories of 
abuse during a clinical interview in which she viewed an 11 year-old video of 
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herself recounting those traumatic events (Corwin & Olafson, 1997; Loftus & 
Guyer, 2002). Although the validity of Jane Doe’s memories has never been proven 
(or disproven), there is no doubt that seeing the video played a crucial part in 
persuading Doe that her original accusations were genuine. The videotape shown to 
Doe would have provided her with two cues: ostensibly clear evidence that she was 
abused, and vivid childhood imagery such as her appearance at the time. The results 
of the present study suggest that these two cues are sometimes sufficient for people 
to create clear false memories of completely fictional events. 
Furthermore, does imagination boost the impact of false evidence in eliciting 
false confessions from criminal suspects? Several studies have shown that 
presenting innocent subjects with false evidence—a legal interrogation technique 
used in some countries to elicit confessions (Gudjonsson, 2003)—can increase their 
likelihood of falsely confessing to and internalizing guilt for a punishable act 
(Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Nash & Wade, in press). To the best of our knowledge, no 
false confession study to date has involved instructing subjects to imagine the 
“crime” after exposure to false evidence, most likely because of the ethical concerns 
such a procedure might raise. Our results suggest that the combination of 
imagination and false evidence in criminal interrogations might be particularly 
powerful in eliciting internalized false confessions or even false memories of 
committing a crime. 
False evidence can change the past. In this paper, we have shown that even our 
memories of recent, self-involving events can be modified by subtle and compelling 
digital trickeries, as well as by imagination, with the two forms of suggestion 
combining to cause remarkably high levels of belief and memory distortion. The 
limits of the false evidence effect remain to be seen. 
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Appendix B – Action lists 
Actions used in Experiment 1 
Balance cards on the glass of water; Browse through the book; Clap your hands 
together; Click your fingers; Count to twenty; Cover your face with your hands; Do 
an impression of a monkey; Flap your arms up and down; Flex your arm; Flip the 
coin; Kiss the magnifying glass; Look through the magnifying glass; Make 
binoculars with your hands; Pick up the dice with the spoon; Play the air guitar; Pull 
a silly face; Pull the rubber band around the book; Push the toy car; Put on the hat; 
Put the empty cup over your ear; Rattle the coin in the empty cup; Recite the 
alphabet; Roll the dice; Rub the Q-tip on the toy car; Rub the Q-tip on your 
eyebrow; Rub the table; Salute; Scratch your nose; Shuffle the deck of cards; Smell 
the flower; Stand up and then sit down; Stir the water with the spoon; Stretch the 
rubber band; Tap the flower on your forehead; Throw the hat in the air; Touch your 
ear to your shoulder; Tug your earlobe; Wave good-bye. 
Actions used in Experiment 2 
Bite your lip; Blow a kiss; Clap your hands; Clasp your hands together; Click 
your fingers; Count the fingers on one hand; Count to twenty; Cross your fingers; 
Cup your hand over your ear; Draw a stick man in the air; Fake a sneeze; Flex your 
arm; Fold your arms; Furrow your eyebrows; Lean over forward; Lick your lips; 
Look under the table; Look up toward the ceiling; Make a tight fist; Make 
binoculars with your hands; Nod in agreement; Play the piano on the desk; Point to 
your mouth; Raise your arms; Repeat 5914; Rest your head in your hands; Roll your 
eyes; Rub your eyes; Rub your stomach; Salute; Scratch your nose; Shake your head 
back and forth; Shrug your shoulders; Slap your thigh; Smooth your hair in the 
back; Stick out your tongue; Tap your wrist; Tilt back in the chair; Touch your 
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cheek; Touch your ear to your shoulder; Touch your elbow with your thumb; Tug 
your earlobe; Turn around in a circle; Wave good-bye; Yawn. 
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Footnotes 
1 Subjects returned for Session 3 according to their availability. When we conducted 
analyses that included only the subjects who completed the study within ±2 days of 
the 15-day ideal (N = 36), the pattern of results did not differ from the results 
presented. 
2 Interpreting null and significant interactions always relies on the assumption that 
there are no scaling effects across levels of the DV(s) (Loftus, 1978). Nonetheless, 
exploring the pattern of effects is an important first step toward understanding joint 
effects. We followed the convention of treating the Belief and Memory scales as 
interval measures in order to analyse our data using parametric procedures, yet it is 
possible these scales are ordinal measures. 
3 Confidence intervals for effect sizes are calculated using software provided by 
Mike Smithson, available at 
http://psychology.anu.edu.au/people/smithson/details/CIstuff/CI.html 
 
